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ABSTRACT: Flood risk management decisions in many countries are based on decision-
support frameworks which rely on cost-benefit analyses. Such frameworks are seldom infor-
mative about the geographical distribution of risk, raising questions on the fairness of the
proposed policies. In the present work, we propose a new decision criterion that accounts
for the distribution of risk reduction and apply it to support flood risk management decisions
on a transboundary stretch of the Rhine River. Three types of interventions are considered:
embankment heightening, making Room for the River, and changing the discharge distribu-
tion of the river branches. The analysis involves solving a flood risk management problem
according to four alternative formulations, based on different ethical principles. Formula-
tions based on cost optimization lead to very poor performances in some areas for the sake of
reducing the overall aggregated costs. Formulations that also include equity criteria have dif-
ferent results depending on how these are defined. When risk reduction is distributed equally,
very poor economic performance is achieved. When risk is distributed equally, results are in
line with formulations based on cost optimization, while a fairer risk distribution is achieved.
Risk reduction measures also differ, with the cost optimization approach strongly favoring
the leverage of changing the discharge distribution and the alternative formulations spending
more on embankment heightening and Room for the River, to rebalance inequalities in risk
levels. The proposed method advances risk-based decision-making by allowing to consider
risk distribution aspects and their impacts on the choice of risk reduction measures.
KEYWORDS: Equity; flood risk management; large-scale systems analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the Elbe River, in Germany, was hit
by a severe flood. The federal states of Saxony (up-
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stream) and Saxony-Anhalt (downstream) incurred
about 8.70 and 1.75 million euros of losses, respec-
tively. As a response, Saxony invested in flood pro-
tection measures. A decade later, in June 2013, the
Elbe River was hit again by one of the most severe
floods in decades (Schro¨ter, Kunz, Elmer, Mu¨hr, &
Merz, 2015), which this time the newly reinforced
embankments of Saxony could withstand. Losses
amounted to about 1.19 million euros for Saxony and
1.92 million euros for Saxony-Anhalt (higher than
those previously experienced) part of which is likely
to be attributed to the increased protection level
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upstream (Thieken et al., 2016). This raised public
concern about the fairness of the implemented mea-
sures. With the aim of limiting controversies of this
kind, the EU Floods Directive 2007/60/EC provides
guidelines to European Member States on flood risk
assessment and management. One of its key guide-
lines relates to the so-called solidarity principle, ac-
cording to which “measures are jointly decided for
the common benefit” and “flood risk management
plans [ . . . ] shall not include measures which signifi-
cantly increase risk upstream and downstream” (Di-
rective 2007/60/EC, 2007).
The implementation of the EU Directive brings
three main challenges. First, a whole system per-
spective must be adopted. Recently, Vorogushyn
et al. (2017) called for an approach to flood risk
management that accounts for interactions between
atmosphere, catchments, river-floodplain, and so-
cioeconomic processes. Second, and connected to the
former point, upstream-downstream trade-offs and
hydraulic interactions, that is, effects of embankment
breaches and cascading flooding between neighbour-
ing protected areas, must be explicitly accounted
for. Previous studies (Apel, Merz, & Thieken, 2009;
Courage, Vrouwenvelder, van Mierlo, & Schweck-
endiek, 2013; De Bruijn, Diermanse, Van Der
Doef, & Klijn, 2016; Vorogushyn, Lindenschmidt,
Kreibich, Apel, & Merz, 2012) showed that neglect-
ing hydraulic interactions leads to unreliable flood
risk estimates, with risk being either overestimated
or underestimated. Third, a thorough analysis of the
fairness of the geographical distribution of flood risk
is needed when deciding upon measures. Addressing
this is not trivial, since defining what is meant by a
fair risk distribution is a research problem in its own
right. To illustrate the problem of what it means for a
risk distribution to be fair, Hayenhjelm (2012) exem-
plifies two policies, which we slightly adjust to better
fit the context of flood risk management. Assuming
there are three areas A, B, and C, from upstream to
downstream, each having an initial flood risk level of
106 euros. There are two possible flood risk reduc-
tion policies, each requiring the same investments
 Policy 1: areas A, B, and C benefit of the same
risk reduction of 1 × 105 euros. The final risks
are equal to 9 × 105 euros each, which amounts
to a total risk of 2.7 × 106 euros.
 Policy 2: areas A and B benefit of the same risk
reduction of 4 × 105 euros, while area C has its
risk increased. The final risks are equal to 6 ×
105, 6 × 105, and 1.3 × 106 euros for A, B, and
C respectively, which amounts to a total risk of
2.5 × 106 euros.
Policy 1 allocates funds in such a way that every
area gains the same benefit from it. In contrast, Pol-
icy 2 makes more efficient use of those funds, since
the overall risk is lower. This, however, comes at the
expense of area C.Which of the two policies is fairer?
A policy-maker favouring economic efficiency would
deem Policy 2 as fairer, as it brings a greater risk re-
duction for society as a whole. Another policy-maker
might consider Policy 1 fairer, as it brings an equal
risk reduction to all. And would the latter change her
mind if areas A and B had started from a higher ini-
tial risk than area C? There is no unique answer to
the question on what a fair risk distribution is. Yet,
it is paramount to make the evaluation of the risk
distribution an inherent part of the methods that are
being applied to support large-scale flood risk man-
agement planning.
Current decision-support methods heavily rely
on cost-benefit analysis (Kind, 2014), which strives
for maximizing the overall aggregated benefit and
often neglect risk distribution considerations (Hans-
son, 2007). Johnson, Penning-Rowsell, and Parker
(2007) find that when funding for flood protection is
allocated relying on cost-benefit analysis, resources
are not be targeted to reduce risk of the most vulner-
able living in areas where the (low) exposed value
does not justify large investments. To address this
issue, there have been attempts to improve cost-
benefit analyses by applying distributional weights to
the aggregation of benefits and costs (Kind, Botzen,
& Aerts, 2017) in order to value the worse-off more.
Similarly, Adler (2011) proposes the use of a con-
tinuous prioritarian social-welfare function for trans-
forming peoples’ preferences for a project into a
measure of overall social welfare. The proposed
function is an increasing and convex function, which
thus gives more importance to the marginal increase
in well-being of those with lower initial well-being
levels. Although these approaches do consider risk
distribution, they are subject to two, interrelated,
limitations. First, risk distribution is not a policy ob-
jective per se, as policies are ranked based on the
optimization of total costs or social welfare, which
thus remain the only policy objective. Second, the ag-
gregation of all benefits into a single objective leads
to a loss of information as it can hide important
trade-offs and thus adversely bias risk-based decision
support (Kasprzyk, Reed, & Hadka, 2016). To ad-
dress the former limitation, a decision criterion which
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allows accounting for risk distribution needs to be
defined. As for the latter limitation, Many-Objective
Evolutionary Algorithms (MOEAs) are typically
used (Coello Coello, Lamont, & Van Veldhuizen,
2007).
MOAEs allow identifying management strate-
gies by optimizing the system under study while
balancing many conflicting criteria. Quinn, Reed,
Giuliani, and Castelletti (2017) introduced the
concept of rival framings, where MOAEs are used to
explore the influence of alternative policy problem
formulations on the policy outcomes. This approach
is particularly relevant when alternative theoretical
frameworks are available for addressing the same
policy problem, like assessing fairness in risk dis-
tribution as discussed above. Previous flood risk
management studies adopting MOEAs focused on
either optimizing overall costs and expected risk
separately (Garner & Keller, 2018; Woodward,
Gouldby, Kapelan, & Hames, 2014; Woodward,
Kapelan, & Gouldby, 2014) or total costs (i.e.,
summing costs and expected risk) for different
geographical areas (Ciullo, de Bruijn, Kwakkel, &
Klijn, 2019). To our knowledge, formulations where
geographical risk distribution as such is considered
as a policy objective to be optimized have never been
explored.
The present study proposes a new decision
criterion that accounts for the geographical distri-
bution of risk and uses MOEAs to optimize both
total costs and equity in risk distribution. The aim
is to explore the policy implications of adopting
alternative ethical principles in the way fairness is
conceptualized and operationalized. We do so by
solving a flood risk management problem according
to four alternative problem formulations, that is, the
policy problem to be solved, each corresponding to a
different way of operationalizing fairness. Although
the study is primarily methodological in character,
we develop it on a case study of the transboundary
area of the German-Dutch Lower Rhine River in
order to connect as close as possible to a realistic and
geographically differentiated flood risk situation.
After discussing alternative ethical principles
and introducing the new decision criterion in section
2, we introduce the case study area in section 3, we
briefly describe the simulation model, measures and
outcomes in section 4, and introduce the four prob-
lem formulations in section 5. Finally, we explain the
adopted method in section 6, we present the results
in section 7, we discuss them and provide conclusions
in section 8.
2. THE RISK DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
AND THE PROPOSED DECISION
CRITERION
In this section, we introduce the philosophical
basis of cost-benefit analysis, we discuss the risk dis-
tribution problem and the way it has been tackled.
After that, we introduce ethical theories dealing with
the problem of fairly allocating risk and, finally, we
introduce the new decision criterion to account for
risk distribution and its inclusion in an optimization
framework.
Cost-benefit analysis is the dominant paradigm
in risk policy (Hayenhjelm&Wolff, 2012). It is essen-
tially motivated by the desire to efficiently allocate
scarce economic resources. In cost-benefit analysis,
policy alternatives are deemed feasible if and only if
the sum of expected benefits exceeds the sum of ex-
pected costs, with the most preferable policy being
the one maximizing the net benefits (i.e., benefits mi-
nus costs).
There are threemajor problems with cost-benefit
analysis applied to flood risk management. First, in-
tangible damages, including loss of human lives, need
to bemonetized in order to include them in the analy-
sis (Kind, 2014). Second, in cost-benefit analysis, risk
is typically defined as the expected value of flood
damage in each given year. Expected values, how-
ever, do not capture society’s risk aversion, that is,
the societal higher concern for rare and catastrophic
flood events than for frequent, less impacting, ones
(Merz, Elmer, & Thieken, 2009). Third, as Hansson
(2007) points out, by aggregating costs and benefits,
cost-benefit analysis relies on the assumption of in-
terpersonal aggregation, where it is assumed that one
person’s or group’s disadvantage can be fully com-
pensated and justified by another person’s or group’s
advantage. It is thus acceptable to treat the involved
parties in such a way that it results in an asymmetric
distribution of benefits, as long as a greater benefit to
society at large can be achieved (Hayenhjelm, 2012).
In response to the third issue, distributive
weights may be applied in the process of aggregating
costs and benefits (Kind et al., 2017). Defining dis-
tributive weights requires specifying people’s utility
function (Adler, 2011). Typically, the better off
people are, the lower the increase in marginal utility
and vice-versa. Therefore, although interpersonal
aggregation is still required, the use of distributive
weights allows accounting for people’s different
levels of well-being. It has been demonstrated that
ranking policies through cost-benefit analysis with
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distributive weights, in that it requires to specify peo-
ple’s utility function, is in fact equivalent to the use
of Social Welfare Functions (SWFs) (Adler, 2011).
SWFs are used to assess the social welfare of policies
based on individual utilities, with the best policy
being the one maximizing social welfare. Specifying
the form of SWF is crucial. Adler (2011) proposes
the use of continuous prioritarian SWF, that is, an in-
creasing and strictly concave function such that there
is a decreasing marginal moral value for increasing
utility levels. This implies that higher weight is given
to increases in utility of people with initially lower
wealth. Therefore, both cost-benefit analysis with
distributive weights and SWF as defined by Adler
(2011) strive for overall efficiency while accounting
for interpersonal risk distribution. However, the
distribution of risk is not a policy objective per se, as
policy evaluation is solely based on the maximization
of aggregated welfare. Alternative ethical theories,
such as egalitarianism and prioritarianism, do, in-
stead, require risk distribution to be the ultimate
goal of policy evaluation (Lamont & Favor, 2017).
Strict egalitarianism conceives inequality as such
not to be justifiable on moral grounds, thus, requir-
ing a perfectly equal distribution of benefits. Strict
egalitarianism is, however, subject to the so-called
levelling down objection (Gosepath, 2011; Hayen-
hjelm, 2012; Lamont & Favor, 2017): for the sake of
equality, everybody may end up being equally worse
off, which is obviously undesirable. An alternative to
egalitarianism is prioritarianism, according to which
benefits should be prioritized to the worst-off (Parfit,
1997). According to prioritarianism, inequalities are
justified if they benefit the worst-off. Egalitarianism
and prioritarianism differ in what they consider to be
the main concern. Egalitarianism is concerned with
relative levels, that is, benefit distribution is unfair if
and only if one person is worse off than another per-
son. Prioritarianims, instead, is concerned with ab-
solute levels, that is, benefit distribution is unfair if
the level of well-being of the worse-off is deemed
unfair, regardless other people’s levels. Irrespective
of the reason why a distribution is deemed unfair,
there is the need to complement cost-benefit anal-
ysis goals of economic efficiency with benefit distri-
bution goals in order to build the pluralistic decision
framework advocated by Johnson et al. (2007) where
system-wide objectives, such as reducing aggregated
costs and benefits, are achieved while ensuring that
all interested parties have an equal opportunity of
having their risk reduced. With this aim, we propose
a decision criterion to account for the distribution of
benefits between affected individuals, groups or, as
applied in the present study, geographical areas.
The approach is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the
top figure shows a stylized flood risk system with two
flood protected areas, A and B, and the bottom figure
provides a visualization of the proposed criterion. In
particular, the distribution of benefits is quantified by
the distance d between the two flood-protected areas,
A and B, in terms of a generic outcome of interest
k quantifying the benefits of a given policy (namely
the difference in performance between the policy and
the status quo) with its exact definition to be agreed
upon based on what is the entity that ought to be
distributed. The bisector is the line of equal bene-
fits, that is, a condition where area A and B have
the same k. The status quo is given by the point of
origin.
As an example, we shall consider point P′, rep-
resenting a policy with performances k′A and k
′
B,
with k′B > k
′
A > 0. The distance between point P’
and the line of equal benefits is:
d =
∣∣k′A− k′B∣∣√
2
, (1)
Moving from point P′ (where k′B > k
′
A) to the
closest point on the bisector (where kB = kA) implies
a reallocation in the performance of indicator k from
area B to area A.
In general, the smaller the distance, the closer
one is to an equal distribution of benefits. Care must
be taken, however, not to incur in a situation in
which, for the sake of equity, everybody is worse off.
This is the case of point P′′, where k
′′
A > 0, k
′′
B < 0
and minimizing the distance d would imply a ten-
dency to a situation where k
′′
A < 0, k
′′
B < 0, that is,
where both indicators perform worse than in the sta-
tus quo. Therefore, in using this new distance crite-
rion, we constrain the analysis to the kA, kB > 0 do-
main.
In light of the introduced concepts of cost-benefit
analysis, egalitarianism and prioritarianism, and us-
ing the proposed decision criterion, we define four
problem formulations in section 5 for managing flood
risk for the case study described in section 3.
3. THE CASE STUDY
The present study focuses on the downstream
part of the Lower Rhine, from Bislich (right bank)
and Xanten (left bank) up to the end of the nontidal
zone of the Dutch Rhine (Fig. 2). The Dutch Rhine
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Fig 1. Top: stylized representation of a flood risk system with two flood protected areas, A and B. Bottom: visualization of the geometric
approach used to quantify the distribution of benefits among areas. The axes represent the outcome indicator of area A, kA, and area B,
kB. The bisector is the line of equal benefits, that is, a condition where area A and B have the same k. Points P’ and P’’ indicate the effect of
two distinct policies on the outcome indicators. The distance d indicates the geometric distance between a point to the bisector line, that is,
d indicates how far the distribution of benefits brought by a given policy is from an equal distribution.
bifurcates into three distributaries, the Waal River to
the southwest, the Nederrijn to the west, and the IJs-
sel River to the north. The study area thus includes
parts of German and Dutch territories.
In Fig. 2, the administrative country border is de-
picted in grey and the thick closed lines represent the
so-called dike-ring areas, that is, alluvial plains that
are protected from flooding by connected embank-
ments. Six macroareas of interest are identified based
on the dike-ring areas and results in the following sec-
tions will refer to these areas. The geographic names
of each area are shown in Table I. Furthermore, we
recognize 70 potential breach locations of interest,
that is, places where the flood protection might fail
resulting in flooding. Breach locations in red affect
transboundary dike-ring areas, implying that flood-
ing causes damage in both countries, regardless of
the country in which the breach is located. In fact,
all considered potential breach locations in Germany
result in transboundary flooding.
6 Ciullo et al.
Fig 2. Case study area. Six macroareas of interest are identified: four Dutch areas (area 0, in red; area 1, in blue; area 2, in orange; area 3,
in black) and two German areas (area 4, in green; area 5, in purple). The administrative country border is depicted in grey. Dots represent
breach locations, with red dots indicating breaches leading to damage in both countries.
4. THE SIMULATIONMODEL, MEASURES,
AND OUTCOMES
The proposed simulation model is a fast, inte-
grated metamodel (Haasnoot et al., 2014). It builds
upon the one introduced in Ciullo et al. (2019),
which was developed for the IJssel River (approx-
imately area 3 in Fig. 2). However, there are two
main differences. First, a more diverse set of possi-
ble flood risk management measures. In Ciullo et al.
(2019), only embankment heightening was consid-
ered; the current version also includes making Room
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Table I. The Geographic Areas of Interest
Identifier 0 1 2 3 4 5
Name Waal River South Central River area Nederrijn-Lek North IJssel River valley Ooij Du¨ffelt polder German Rhine North
Fig 3. Schematic view of inputs and outputs of the simulation
model. More information on the simulation model are provided
in the Supporting Information and in Ciullo et al. (2019).
for the River and influencing the discharge distribu-
tion over the three river branches. Second, a damage
model was developed to ensure consistency in dam-
age assessment in both countries. We describe the
above-mentioned differences in the following sec-
tions and provide a schematic representation of the
model’s inputs and outputs in Fig. 3. More informa-
tion about the model is provided in the Supporting
Information and we refer the reader to Ciullo et al.
(2019) for a detailed description.
4.1. Flood Risk Reduction Measures
Three flood risk reduction measures are possi-
ble: embankment heightening, making Room for the
River, and changing the discharge distribution at the
bifurcation points. Embankments can be raised up
to 1 meter, with steps of 10 cm. Embankment raising
costs are simulated as in Eijgenraam Brekelmans,
den Hertog, and Roos (2017):
I =
{
0 if u = 0
(c + bu) e−λ(W+u) if u > 0 (2)
where u is the degree of embankment heightening;
parameters c and b are fixed and variable costs,
respectively; λ is a scale parameter, and W is the
cumulative embankment heightening over the entire
planning period, establishing increasing costs per
heightening unit as embankments become higher. As
in the present work, a single optimal embankment
height is identified, W is assumed to be equal to zero.
Parameters c, b, and λ are assigned per stretch of the
embankment system and their values are provided
by De Grave and Baarse (2011).
As for making room for the river, there are 156
Room for the River projects available to choose from
along theDutch Rhine, based on an existing database
(Van Schijndel, 2005). For our simulation, a project
can simply be either implemented or not. Costs of
Room for the River projects range from 50.000 eu-
ros to about 2 billion euros.
As for making changes to the discharge distri-
bution, there are two bifurcation points of interest;
the default flow distributions are the ones provided
by a SOBEK model calibrated on the case study. At
each bifurcation point, it is assumed that a distribu-
tion change of plus/minus 30% of the default distri-
bution can be implemented. There are no costs as-
sociated with changing the discharge distribution as
it may be accomplished by adjusting the hydraulic
structures currently in place.
4.2. Damage Estimation
Due to the transboundary nature of the problem
at hand, consistency of damage estimates between
the two countries is paramount, thus, the exposure
data as well as the adopted damage model should
come from the same source and rely on the same as-
sumptions.
We use exposure data from the CORINE Land
Cover dataset (EEA, 2016) and the global flood
depth-damage functions proposed in Huizinga, De
Moel, and Szewczyk (2017). These provide normal-
ized damage functions per land use category per con-
tinent as well as a country-wise maximum damage
value. The final flood depth-damage functions result
from the multiplication of the two and they are thus
country-specific.
The CORINE Land Cover dataset distinguishes
44 classes while the global flood depth-damagemodel
provides damage functions for only a few land-
use categories: residential, commercial, industrial,
agricultural, infrastructural, and transportation, re-
ferred to here as “JRC Land-use categories.” Each
CORINE class is related to percentages of JRC land-
use categories. For example, the CORINE land use
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class 111 consists for 50% of “residential,” for 5%
of “commercial,” and for 18% of “transport.” There-
fore, the final damage functions of each CORINE
class result from the weighted sum of damage func-
tions for each JRC land-use category, with the
weights being the percentage of land-use categories
in each class. The CORINE classes, the percentage
of JRC land-use category per class can be found in
Huizinga (2007).
Damage is calculated based on flooding simu-
lations from the VNK project (in Dutch: Veiligheid
Nederland in Kaart, in English FLORIS: Flood
Risks and Safety in the Netherlands) (Jongejan &
Maaskant, 2015). VNK is a major flood risk analysis
project which relies on flooding simulations for three
flood levels: the design flood levels as well as those
that are expected 10 times more frequently and 10
times less frequently. Each of the three VNK flood-
ing simulations has a return period and a water level
in the river associated with it. Consequently, for each
location a relationship can be established between re-
turn periods, water levels in the river and damages.
Damages of flood events with return periods other
than the three simulated are found by linear interpo-
lation.
Finally, VNK also provides a maximum water
depth map per dike-ring area, meaning that no higher
water depths can be reasonably expected. A max-
imum damage per dike-ring area can thus be cal-
culated, which is used as upper boundary in case
the superimposition of damage estimates of different
breach locations in the same dike ring would exceed
this maximum.
4.3. Model Outcomes
The model produces eight outcomes of inter-
est, viz. the present value of expected annual damage,
EAD in each of the six areas in Fig. 2 and the in-
vestment costs, I of a given policy for the two coun-
tries. The latter are the sum of the costs of heighten-
ing the embankments and those of the implemented
Room for the River projects. We refer to total costs
as the sum between the present value of expected
annual damage and investment costs. The present
value of expected annual damage is defined as
follows:
EAD(T, r) =
T∑
t=1
∫ +∞
Hmin
p(H) L(u,H)dH
(1+ r)t (3)
where L is the flood damage (€); H is the water
level in the river (m + m.s.l.), with Hmin being the
lowest water level causing flood damage; u repre-
sents the effect of the chosen policy on the loss es-
timates; p(H) is the probability density function of a
given water level H; T is the planning period (i.e., 200
years), r the discount rate (3.5% per year). Clearly,
lower (higher) values of discount rate increase (de-
crease) investments. However, using a single value
suffices our scope of exploring the differences regard-
ing where investments are directed across formula-
tions, as the same discount rate would anyway apply
to all of them.
5. THE PROBLEM FORMULATIONS
In this section, we introduce four alternative
problem formulations for the case study, based on
the theories and decision criterion introduced in
section 2. Furthermore, connections of the four for-
mulations and their underlying principles to either
previous studies or established practice in flood risk
management are provided.
The first and second problem formulations fol-
low a cost-benefit analysis approach. The third and
fourth complement cost-benefit analysis by also us-
ing the new decision criterion but they differ in their
conceptualization of the outcome indicator k, that is,
in what ought to be distributed. In the risk ethics lit-
erature, the following have been proposed as entity
to be distributed: economic resources, final risk lev-
els, and degree of risk reduction (Doorn, 2015). We
focus on the latter two.
Ideally, when applying the new decision crite-
rion, the distance is calculated between each pair of
areas. However, in so doing the number of decision
criteria to be optimized in a case such as the one
in Fig. 2 would soon become too large. That is why in
the present work the distance is calculated between
each area i and all the other ones, as if they were a
single area. Referring to the bottom panel of Fig. 1,
the axes would thus represent the outcome indicator
of area i, ki, and the aggregation of all other areas but
i,kj, j =i .
In all problem formulations, investment costs I
in the Netherlands (areas from 0 to 3) are sub-
ject to a maximum investment constraint of 1 bil-
lion. In Germany (areas 4 and 5), because there
are fewer locations and embankment heightening is
the only possible intervention, the total maximum
investment costs are still below what is practically
Operationalising Ethical Principles in Flood Risk Management 9
reasonable to invest. Thus, no investment cost con-
straint is applied.
In the mathematical formalization of the prob-
lem formulations provided in the next subsections,
indices i and j refer to the five flood protected areas
in Fig. 2 and can thus take value from 0 to 5.
5.1. First Problem Formulation: Cost-Benefit
Analysis (CBA)
The first problem formulation follows a cost-
benefit approach (in the remainder, CBA) and it is
defined as follows:
minimize
i=3∑
i=0
(Ii + EADi ),
i=5∑
i=4
(Ii + EADi ) (4)
with
i=3∑
i=0
Ii ≤ 109
This formulation is equivalent to the one
adopted in previous studies like those of Brekel-
mans, den Hertog, Roos, and Eijgenraam (2012),
Kind (2014), and Eijgenraam et al. (2017).
5.2. Second Problem Formulation: Constrained
Cost-Benefit Analysis (cCBA)
The second problem formulation constrains the
cost-benefit analysis approach (in the remainder,
cCBA) by guaranteeing that no area is worse than
in the status quo. It is defined as follows:
minimize
i=3∑
i=0
(Ii + EADi ),
i=5∑
i=4
(Ii + EADi ) (5)
with
i−3∑
i−0
Ii ≤ 109
EADi ≤ EAD0|i ∀i (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
This formulation constrains cost-benefit analy-
sis, and thus, resembles the principles of the Dutch
flood risk management policy, where differentiation
of protection levels based on economic considera-
tions is aimed for while at the same time basic secu-
rity is provided to all citizens (Jonkman, Jongejan, &
Maaskant, 2011; Van Der Most, 2010).
5.3. Third Problem Formulation: Egalitarian
In the third problem formulation, in addition to
minimizing total costs, the distance between perfor-
mance indicators ki, kj, j =i is minimized, with the two
indicators being defined as follows:
ki = (EAD0|i − EADi )∑
j EAD0| j
kj,j =i =
∑
j, j=i (EAD0| j −EADj )∑
j EAD0| j
where risk reductions are normalized over the total
initial risk (
∑
j EAD0| j ) for convenience. This prob-
lem formulation seeks for an equal distribution of risk
reduction (difference between the initial risk level
EAD0 and the final risk EAD) and it thus qualifies as
an egalitarian problem formulation. As such, this for-
mulation resembles the flood risk policy principles of
countries which apply equal protection standards to
all areas, for example, Austria (Thaler & Hartmann,
2016).
The problem formulation reads as follows:
minimize
i=3∑
i=0
(Ii + EADi ),
i=5∑
i=4
(Ii + EADi ) (6)
∣∣ki − kj, j =i ∣∣√
2
, ∀i, j (0, 1, 2, 3)
∣∣ki − kj, j =i ∣∣√
2
, for i = 4, j = 5
with
i=3∑
i=0
Ii ≤ 109
EADi ≤ EAD0|i , ∀i (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
Thus, there are seven decision objectives to be
minimized. Two cost objectives and five distance ob-
jectives. With respect to the latter, four objectives
concern the four areas in the Netherlands and the
remaining one concerns the two German areas to-
gether.
5.4. Fourth Problem Formulation: Prioritarian
The fourth problem formulation resembles the
third. The main difference is that the performance in-
dicators ki, kj, j =i are now defined as:
ki = (EAD0|i − EADi )EAD0|i
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kj, j =i =
∑
j, j=i (EAD0| j − EADj )∑
j, j=i EAD0| j
In this problem formulation, an equal distribu-
tion of relative risk reduction is sought. The relative
risk reduction is defined as the difference between
the initial risk level EAD0 and the final risk EAD,
normalized by the initial risk level. This means that,
in order to minimize the distance, areas with a higher
initial risk will benefit from larger risk reductions.
This formulation, therefore, prioritizes interventions
to higher risk areas and in this it qualifies as a priori-
tarian formulation. It reads as follows:
minimize
i=3∑
i=0
(Ii + EADi ),
i=5∑
i=4
(Ii + EADi ) (7)
∣∣ki − kj, j =i ∣∣√
2
, ∀i, j (0, 1, 2, 3)
∣∣ki − kj, j =i ∣∣√
2
, for i = 4, j = 5
with
i=3∑
i=0
Ii ≤ 109
EADi ≤ EAD0|i ∀i (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
This formulation, in that it relies on the princi-
ple of prioritizing interventions to higher risk areas,
resembles the flood risk management approach fol-
lowed in the United Kingdom, where expenditures
for flood defenses are allocated taking into account
the presence of deprived areas (Penning-Rowsell,
Priest, & King, 2016).
6. METHODS
The four problem formulations are solved us-
ing the Many Objective Evolutionary Algorithm
(MOEA) (Coello Coello et al., 2007) ε-NSGAII
(Kollat & Reed, 2005). A detailed description of ε-
NSGAII is provided in the Supporting Information.
MOEAs represent metaheuristic approaches to find
a Pareto-approximate set of solutions, that is, solu-
tions for which it is impossible to improve a single
objective without decreasing the performance of at
least one other objective.
In the MOEA search, expected annual dam-
ages are calculated based on 10 upstream high-flood
waves (i.e., with probabilities of less than 1:125 per
year). A larger number would require longer compu-
tation times and make the optimization unfeasible,
as the total number of required evaluations becomes
too large. Once optimal policies are identified, how-
ever, their performance is re-evaluated for a larger
sample of 2,500 river flood waves. After that, a fi-
nal set of policies is selected such that each policy
(irrespective of the formulation it derives from) is
Pareto dominant in terms of total costs in the two
countries and expected annual damage at the six
flood-protected areas. This guarantees that no poli-
cies that after the re-evaluation exhibit higher total
costs and higher risks at all areas—and which are thus
undefendable—are considered.
Finally, in order to quantify inequality, we use
the Gini index. The Gini index is widely used in wel-
fare economics in order to measure income inequal-
ity, and is defined as follows:
G =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1|xi − xj |
2n2 x¯
where x is an observed value, n is the number of val-
ues, and x¯ is the mean value.
The analysis is carried out through the Ex-
ploratory Modelling and Analysis Workbench
(EMA-Workbench) (Kwakkel, 2017), an open
source toolkit developed in the Python programming
language.
7. RESULTS
In what follows, we use the term policy to ad-
dress a specific combination of interventions, com-
prising different locations and degree of (1) rais-
ing embankments, (2) making Room for the River,
and (3) changes to the discharge distribution. Pareto
fronts of the optimal policies resulting from the ε-
NSGAII search, the epsilon values of the decision
objectives, the scores of the performance metrics,
and the comparison between the performance of
policies under the reference sample and the larger
sample are reported in Supporting information. As
explained in section 6, the analysis presented below
relies on policies which, after the re-evaluation, are
Pareto dominant in terms of total costs and expected
annual damages.
First, results are shown based on decision ob-
jectives. In particular, policies’ performances are as-
sessed in terms of aggregated total costs, investment
costs, and final risk levels of the two countries (Fig. 4)
and final risk levels of each geographic area (Figs. 5
and 6). Second, policies are shown in terms of deci-
sion variables for each geographic area (Fig. 7). Last,
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Fig 4. Total costs (left column), investment costs (mid-column), and final risk (right column) of the Netherlands (y-axis) and Germany
(x-axis) for all problem formulations, which follows the colors reported in the legend. In each box all policies, regardless the problem
formulation, are plotted (grey dots) and those belonging to the problem formulation of interest are highlighted. The black dot represents
the status quo. The black arrows indicate the direction of preference, that is, the lower total costs, the better, with an ideal policy having the
lowest total costs in Germany and the Netherlands.
the Gini index and total costs for the two countries
are compared (Fig. 8).
Fig. 4 shows total costs, investment costs, and
final risks of the two countries for each problem
formulation. It is worth stressing that the CBA and
cCBA are based on optimizing total costs only, thus,
a Pareto front can be clearly recognized. These
problem formulations reach very low total costs, im-
plying very low investment costs and aggregated final
risks.
Policies from egalitarian and prioritarian lead to
higher total costs. Interestingly, egalitarian requires
higher investment costs and results in larger final
expected damage, whereas prioritarian only requires
higher investment costs with expected damage
levels being comparable to those reached by the
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Fig 5. Left column: Initial risks (first row) and final risks (from second to last row) for each problem formulation. Right column: final risk
normalized over initial risk values for each problem formulation. The dotted lines represent a value equal to one, that is, the status quo.
Each color represents a problem formulation as indicated in the legend.
formulations based on cost-benefit analysis. Finally,
it is found that an improvement with respect to the
status quo is reached by all problem formulations
except for egalitarian, where some policies result in
higher total costs than the status quo, because the
investments are higher than the achieved aggregated
risk reduction.
Fig. 5 shows final risk levels both in absolute
terms as well as normalized over the initial value. In
the case of normalized risk levels, crossing the dotted
horizontal line means a risk increase with respect to
the initial level. The figure shows the results across
geographical areas and for each problem formula-
tion. Fig. 6 shows complementary results, where ab-
solute final risk levels are shown across problem for-
mulations and for each area.
Interestingly, results on the left column of
Fig. 5 show that only egalitarian maintains the same
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Fig 6. Boxplots of final risk levels across problem formulations for all geographical areas. Each color represents a problem formulation as
reported on the y-axis.
ranking of risk levels across geographical areas with
respect to the initial situation. This is in line with the
definition of this formulation, where risk reduction
is distributed equally across areas. In the other
problem formulations, the area with the largest final
risk is area 4, which is, however, the area with the
third largest risk in the initial situation. Areas 1 and
2, which are those with the largest initial risk, have
their risk decreased. This especially occurs in the
CBA and cCBA, meaning that a unit of investment
cost provided the largest risk reduction in these
areas. Prioritarian is in line with these two formula-
tions but provides less risk reduction to area 1. At
the same time, however, as can be seen from Fig. 6,
prioritarian is the best performer of all formulations
for area 4, which is the area where final risk is the
largest.
The right column of Fig. 5 shows a risk increase
in area 3 for CBA in about 50% of the cases with
respect to the status quo. This means that a risk
reduction for the system as a whole is achieved at
the expense of one area. This is a direct consequence
of the aggregated cost efficiency nature of this
formulation, which is known as the aggregation worry
(Hayenhjelm, 2012). Related to this, CBA is also
the worst performer in area 3 (see Fig. 6). Although
less frequently, also prioritarian can lead to risk
increase in area 3. However, this only occurs after
re-evaluating under the larger sample (as shown
by Fig. 11 in the Supporting information) and,
therefore, it is not due to the way the formulation
is defined. Formulation cCBA is the only one that
always leads to an improved situation for all areas.
This is in line with the definition of this formulation,
14 Ciullo et al.
Fig 7. Boxplots of decision variables of the Pareto approximate sets where each color represents a problem formulation as indicated in the
legend. The first row shows levels of embankment heightening. The second row shows the degree of water level lowering obtained from
making room for the river. In the first and second rows, German areas are reported first. The third row shows the fraction of incoming water
discharged to each branch: the Waal (affecting areas A0 and A1), the Pannerdens Canal (affecting areas A1, A2, and A3), the Nederrijn
(affecting areas A1, A2), and the IJssel (affecting area A3). The default distribution (i.e., no policy change) is shown by the black triangle.
which is still met after the re-evaluation under the
larger sample. As can be seen from Fig. 6, cCBA
can however perform poorly for low risk areas like
area 5. Finally, normalized risk levels of egalitarian
suggest a comparable distribution of benefits among
all areas, which, however, can lead to very poor
performances in high risk areas, as can be seen from
the performance in areas 1 and 2 in Fig. 6.
To sum up, CBA performs very well for high risk
areas at the expense of one other area, where risk
increases. The cCBA formulation brings a net ben-
efit to all areas, but compared to the other formula-
tions it can perform poorly for initially low risk areas.
Egalitarian distributes risk reduction equally across
all areas, and in so doing it performs poorly for all ini-
tially high-risk areas. Prioritarian performs similarly
to CBA and cCBA in terms of allocation of risk re-
duction, but it is never the worst performer, as it is
instead the case for both CBA and cCBA. In particu-
lar, focusing on final risk at area 4 under prioritarian,
although this is the highest among all areas (Fig. 5), it
is still the lowest when compared to what result from
the other problem formulations (Fig. 6).
Fig. 7 shows the identified optimal policies in
terms of required interventions for all problem
formulations. Changing the discharge distribution
affects more than one area, therefore, in Fig. 7, the
name of the river branch is specified along with
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Fig 8. Performance of policies in terms of total costs, the Gini index for final levels of expected annual damages and the Gini index for
expected annual damage reduction with respect to the staus quo. The top-right panel shows performances in the 3D space and the direction
of preference of each decision criterion, whereas the other panels show each a different 2D projection of the 3D panel.
the affected areas. From the top to the bottom,
rows show boxplots expressing the sum of the
embankment heightening, the sum of the water level
lowering due to making Room for the River and the
fraction of the discharge diverted to each branch. It is
worth stressing that, at the second bifurcation, similar
distributions may imply quite different discharge into
the distributaries, being a distribution defined as the
fraction of incoming water, which of course depends
on the discharge distribution at the first bifurcation.
Finally, at each bifurcation point, decisions on the
fraction of water sent to each branch are comple-
mentary, with their sum being always equal to one.
In terms of raising embankments, egalitarian
and prioritarian lead to higher embankments every-
where. Interestingly, cCBA leads to lower German
embankments in area 5 which is for the sake of pro-
tecting the downstream area 3 along the IJssel River.
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In terms of discharge distribution, CBA supports
sending slightly less water to the Waal than what
is currently done and, consequently, more into the
other branches. All remaining problem formulations
keep the current discharge distribution at the first
bifurcation point. At the second bifurcation point,
most of the water is sent to the IJssel, with the Ned-
errijn having its discharges substantially reduced.
Yet, there are some differences across problem
formulations.
Overall, cCBA is more conservative in terms of
discharge distribution (i.e., closer to the status quo)
than CBA. This reveals how important discharge dis-
tribution policies are in regulating risk levels across
the system and in guaranteeing that none of the
areas has its risk disproportionately increased. Egal-
itarian and prioritarian imply similar embankment
heightening and Room for the River projects along
areas 1 and 2. In prioritarian, however, the Nederrijn
receives less water, resulting in an overall higher pro-
tection level than in egalitarian (as can be also seen
in Fig. 6).
Fig. 8 shows the performance of the policies in
terms of systems’ total costs (i.e., sum of total costs
in Germany and the Netherlands) and two differ-
ent evaluations of the Gini index. The Gini index
is evaluated in terms of expected damage and ex-
pected damage reduction. In this figure, only those
policies which do not increase risk in any area are
considered.
Policies are shown in the 3D space and in
the three 2D spaces, to highlight the Pareto front
between each pair of decision criteria (i.e., plots
a, b, c). An ideal policy would be found in the
bottom-left corner of each of these plots. A trade-off
between total cost (i.e., efficiency) and the Gini-
index scores (i.e., equal distribution of benefits)
emerges, in both evaluations of the Gini index (i.e.,
plots a, b). The most efficient policy is obtained
from CBA, and this is in line with the nature of the
formulation. In plot (a), a slight increase in terms of
equity can be achieved with cCBA and the lowest
Gini can be reached with prioritarian.
The same results are found in plot (b), where,
however, higher equity (low Gini) is reached by
egalitarian. This is in accordance with the way
expected damage distribution is conceptualized in
the two formulations. In the case of egalitarian,
expected damage is distributed regardless the initial
levels of each area, thus, trying to achieve the most
equal distribution of expected damage reduction.
In contrast, prioritarian prioritizes investments in
higher initial expected damage areas, thus, levelling
the gap in terms of final levels of expected damages.
This is also evident in plot (c), where the two eval-
uations of the Gini index are compared. The best
performers (low Gini) in terms of expected damage
reduction belong to egalitarian, while prioritarian
leads to lower Gini when expected damages are
considered.
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In the present study, we propose a decision crite-
rion to properly account for the distribution of ben-
efits of a given policy across geographical areas. The
criterion is used to explore the policy implications of
adopting alternative ethical principles in supporting
flood risk management decisions. The area of appli-
cation is the Lower Rhine River.
Four ethical principles are considered, each lead-
ing to a different problem formulation. The first and
second problem formulations (CBA and cCBA, re-
spectively) are based on minimizing total costs, the
difference being that in cCBA no risk increase with
respect to the status quo is allowed in any area. In the
third problem formulation (egalitarian), risk reduc-
tion is distributed equally among areas. The fourth
problem formulation (prioritarian) distributes risk by
prioritizing areas with larger risk.
Because of the aggregation of costs and bene-
fits, CBA leads to the so-called aggregation worry,
that is, it performs well for some areas at the expense
of other areas where risk increases. Although cCBA
overcomes this, it leads to an unbalanced risk distri-
bution by favoring some areas at the cost of others.
Egalitarian increases the equity of the implemented
policies; however, it performs very poorly for high
risk areas and, in general, it costs more and yet re-
sults in larger aggregated risk. Prioritarian reduces
expected damages following the same allocation pat-
tern as CBA and cCBA. It never performs as the
worst formulation and it achieves the highest risk re-
duction in the area that is worst off compared to the
other formulations. In other words, it seems to be
economically efficient while limiting unbalances in
benefit distribution between areas. This latter point
is achieved by investing more in comparison to CBA
and cCBA but at the same time spending money
more wisely (from an economic viewpoint) than egal-
itarian.
Although presented in the context of flood risk
management, the proposed approach is general
as it improves model-based decision support by
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enabling to account for risk distribution. The ap-
proach reveals otherwise hidden trade-offs between
risk reduction and risk distribution objectives, thus,
broadening the spectrum of policy objectives most
cost-benefit analyses rely on. Furthermore, as it is
found that the choice of what ought to be distributed
matters, the proposed approach allows taking into
account the effects of alternative distributional
choices on the performance of policies and, as such,
it enables policy makers to operationalize alternative
ethical principles and to elicit their preferences in
balancing efficiency in risk reduction and equity in
risk distribution.
Finally, the proposed framework relies on a deci-
sion criterion that is defined based on area-wide per-
formances, that is, on changes in overall risk of flood
protected areas. As these areas can generally be very
large and diverse in terms of internal socioeconomic
conditions, future research may focus on advancing
the presented approach by adopting a finer resolu-
tion. On the one hand, this will increase the com-
plexity of the analysis as it will require dealing with a
larger number of interested parties and, therefore, of
decision objectives to optimize. On the other hand,
it will allow accounting for risk shifts while also tak-
ing into account the socioeconomic peculiarities of
the various communities living within a given area
and, therefore, differentiating between wealthy and
deprived communities.
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Fig. 1. The modeling scheme (adapted from Ciullo
et al. 2019).
Fig. 2. Hypervolume of the final set of the final
set of epsilon-dominant solutions after the seed
analysis
Fig. 3. Epsilon-progress and hypervolume progres-
sion against the number of function evaluations of
the five optimizations of the first problem formula-
tion.
Fig. 4. Epsilon-dominant solutions after five opti-
mizations for the first problem formulations: objec-
tives relate to total costs in the Netherlands (Total
Costs_nl, euros) and total costs in Germany (Total
Costs_de, euros).
Fig. 5. Epsilon-progress and hypervolume progres-
sion against the number of function evaluations of
the five optimizations of the second problem formu-
lation.
Fig. 6. Epsilon-dominant solutions after five opti-
mizations for the second problem formulations: ob-
jectives relate to total costs in the Netherlands (Total
Costs_nl, euros) and total costs in Germany (Total
Costs_de, euros).
Fig. 7. Epsilon-progress and hypervolume progres-
sion against the number of function evaluations of
the five optimizations of the third problem formula-
tion.
Fig. 8. Epsilon-dominant solutions after five opti-
mizations for the third problem formulations: objec-
tives relate to total costs in the Netherlands (Total
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Costs_nl, euros) and total costs in Germany (Total
Costs_de, euros), and the distance criterion of each
area.
Fig. 9. Epsilon-progress and hypervolume progres-
sion against the number of function evaluations of
the five optimizations of the fourth problem formu-
lation.
Fig. 10. Epsilon-dominant solutions after five opti-
mizations for the fourth problem formulations:
objectives relate to total costs in the Netherlands
(Total Costs_nl) and total costs in Germany (To-
tal Costs_de), and the distance criterion of each
area.
Fig. 11. Comparison of the performance of the op-
timal policies under the reference sample and un-
der a 250 times larger sample. The first row shows
results in terms of total costs in Germany and the
Netherlands.
